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“WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE”: THE CASE FOR A 
STANDARD-BASED APPROACH TO DETERMINING 
WORKER QUALIFICATION FOR UNEMPLOYMENT 
BENEFITS 
Emily Toler* 
Abstract: Under Washington’s Employment Security Act, workers who voluntarily quit 
their jobs are qualified to receive unemployment benefits only if they establish “good cause” 
for leaving work. For forty years, the agency that administers the statute and the courts had 
substantial discretion to find good cause under the statute’s flexible, standard-based 
approach. However, beginning in 1977, the legislature began to restrict the scope of that 
discretion by moving toward a rule-based approach. This trend reached its apex in 2009, 
when the legislature stripped the agency and the courts of all discretion and limited good 
cause to eleven reasons enumerated in the statute. This Comment argues that Washington 
should restore administrative and judicial discretion and return to a standard-based approach 
to determining whether claimants have good cause for voluntarily leaving work. First, a 
standard is more theoretically sound than a rule because workers’ reasons for leaving work 
vary significantly and because the usual rationales for rules do not justify their use in the 
voluntary quit statute. Second, the rule disqualifies claimants who leave work for reasons 
consistent with the purpose of the Act. Finally, a standard is necessary to advance the 
purpose of the Act and of unemployment compensation generally. 
INTRODUCTION 
Unemployment benefits provide a critical buffer against the social 
and economic consequences that can befall people who are out of work. 
Despite the important role these benefits play, not all unemployed 
people are eligible to receive them. In Washington, workers who 
voluntarily leave their jobs must establish “good cause” for quitting to 
qualify for benefits.1 For forty years after Washington first provided 
unemployment benefits, the “voluntary quit” statute provided a flexible, 
standard-based definition of good cause. However, in the 1970s, the 
legislature began to narrow the definition of good cause and restrict the 
discretion that decision-makers had to determine whether workers 
established good cause. This trend ultimately transformed the voluntary 
quit statute from a flexible standard to a rigid rule that has disqualified 
* The author worked with the Unemployment Law Project in Seattle, Washington from 2012–2014. 
The Unemployment Law Project is a legal aid organization that provides advice and representation 
to claimants in unemployment appeals. 
1.  WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(a) (2012). 
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thousands of people, even those who left work for reasons consistent 
with the purpose of Washington’s Employment Security Act.2 
Part I of this Comment briefly summarizes the history of 
unemployment compensation in Washington and outlines the basic 
structure and procedure of a claim for unemployment benefits. Part II 
summarizes the differences between rules and standards, discusses the 
legal contexts in which each approach is more appropriate, and explains 
the importance of this distinction. Part III reviews the history of good 
cause for leaving work and traces the evolution of the voluntary quit 
statute. Part IV argues that the current rule-based approach to making 
good cause determinations is inappropriate because a standard-based 
approach is more theoretically sound and is necessary to promote both 
the goals of the Employment Security Act and of unemployment 
compensation generally. Finally, Part V proposes standard-based 
language to amend the voluntary quit statute and restore administrative 
and judicial discretion to find good cause for leaving work. 
I. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION IN WASHINGTON 
A. Historical Context and Background 
Before the 1930s, no state provided unemployment compensation.3 
However, as the Great Depression ground on, the national 
unemployment rate remained stubbornly high, reaching its peak of 
25.2% in 1933 and remaining above 15% for virtually the entire decade.4 
Many people seeking work were chronically or “hard-core”5 
unemployed: they had been jobless for a year or more, and employers—
for reasons as varied as skepticism about their skills to outright racism—
refused to hire them.6 This “irreversible structural unemployment”7 
effectively barred “10 percent of the labor force”8 from finding work.9 
Other marginalized people, including older, nonwhite, and unskilled 
2. Id. §§ 50.01.05–50.98.110. 
3. See Edwin E. Witte, Development of Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE L.J. 21, 25–29 
(1945). 
4. Richard J. Jensen, The Causes and Cures of Unemployment in the Great Depression, 19 J. 
INTERDISC. HIST. 553, 557 (1989). 
5. Id. at 555–56. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 556. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
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workers, were far more likely to be unemployed.10 Many people found 
work only through the New Deal’s work relief programs11 and were 
unable to find private employment until World War II.12 
Despite this crisis, and despite a “rapidly growing interest in 
unemployment insurance throughout the country,”13 the states remained 
reluctant to enact unemployment compensation legislation.14 To induce 
the states to adopt such laws, Congress introduced a cooperative federal-
state system to administer unemployment compensation15 as part of the 
Social Security Act of 1935.16 The strategy proved successful, and in 
just two years, every state had passed unemployment compensation 
laws.17 
Washington was by no means among the first states to act,18 but in 
1937, the legislature passed the Unemployment Compensation Act.19 In 
the Act’s statement of purpose, the legislature recognized that 
“economic insecurity due to unemployment is a serious menace to the 
health, morals and welfare of the people of this state,”20 and enacted the 
legislation “to prevent its spread and to lighten its burden which now so 
often falls with crushing force upon the unemployed worker and his 
family.”21 The Act was to protect unemployed people “against this 
10. See id. at 567–71; Robert A. Margo, Employment and Unemployment in the 1930s, 7 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 41, 53–54 (1993) (noting the exacerbating effects of long-term unemployment). 
11. Robert A. Margo, The Microeconomics of Depression Unemployment, 51 J. ECON. HIST. 333, 
337–39 (1991). 
12. See id. at 339. 
13. Witte, supra note 3, at 26. 
14. See id. at 25–29. For example, in 1931, twenty-three bills were introduced in state 
legislatures, but none was passed. Id. at 26. In 1933, “68 bills were introduced in 25 states,” but 
none was made law. Id. at 27. States were also reluctant to adopt unemployment compensation 
programs because they worried about “handicapp[ing their] employers in interstate markets by 
burdening them with costs their competitors in other states were not required to meet.” Id. at 28. 
15. Id. at 22, 32. 
16. Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 301–1397jj (2006)). 
17. Witte, supra note 3, at 34. 
18. See id. at 33 (discussing the states that enacted unemployment compensation laws before or 
soon after the federal bill’s passage). 
19. Unemployment Compensation Act, ch. 162, 1937 Wash. Sess. Laws 574 (codified as 
amended at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 50.01.05–50.98.110 (2012 & Supp. 2013)). In 1953, the Act was 
renamed and given its current title, the Employment Security Act. Employment Security Act, ch. 8, 
sec. 24, § 1, 1953 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 884, 904 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. 
CODE §§ 50.01.05–50.98.110). 
20. Unemployment Compensation Act § 2, 1937 Wash. Sess. Laws at 574. 
21. Id. at 574–75. 
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greatest hazard of our economic life,”22 and it was to “be liberally 
construed for the purpose of reducing involuntary unemployment and 
the suffering caused thereby to the minimum.”23 
Notwithstanding this sweeping language, national debates about 
unemployment compensation had already made it clear that benefits 
would not be available to all workers. Instead, they would be available 
only to workers who (in addition to other eligibility criteria) had not 
committed some disqualifying act: 
Whatever the plan, such [unemployment] insurance is based 
upon the assumption that society and industry bear a 
responsibility for the failure of the economic system to provide 
men with an opportunity to support themselves by their own 
work. For those who, on the other hand, are unemployed 
because they prefer idleness to labor, the insurance measures 
accept no responsibility. The problem of framing a practical 
scheme to separate the wheat from the chaff thus centers in a 
definition of compensable unemployment. 
  If a man voluntarily leaves a job without reasonable cause, or 
is discharged for misconduct, his unemployment presents the 
clearest kind of case for which no social responsibility is 
assumed.24 
Washington’s Unemployment Compensation Act reflected those same 
concerns. The Act disqualified claimants who received certain other 
public benefits (e.g., social security),25 were out of work because of a 
labor dispute,26 failed to search for or accept suitable work without good 
cause,27 were discharged for work-connected misconduct,28 or 
voluntarily left work without good cause.29 
The current statute retains these disqualification provisions30 and adds 
disqualifications for misrepresentation,31 attending school,32and failing 
22. Id. at 575. 
23. Id. 
24. The Definition of Unemployment in Unemployment Insurance Measures, 44 HARV. L. REV. 
285, 286 (1930) (footnotes omitted) (summarizing trends in proposed unemployment compensation 
legislation). 
25. Unemployment Compensation Act § 5(f), 1937 Wash. Sess. Laws at 582. 
26. Id. § 5(e), at 581–82. 
27. Id. § 5(d), at 580–81. 
28. Id. § 5(b), at 580. 
29. Id. § 5(a), at 580. 
30. See generally WASH. REV. CODE §§ 50.20.044–50.20.090 (2012). 
31. Id. § 50.20.070. 
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to attend a mandatory “job search workshop” or other training course.33 
Most of the current disqualification provisions are substantially the 
same as their 1937 counterparts.34 However, the legislature has enacted 
significant changes to two of the provisions: discharge for work-
connected misconduct35 and voluntarily leaving work without good 
cause.36 This Comment focuses on the disqualification for voluntarily 
leaving work without good cause.37 
B. The Basic Structure and Procedure of a Claim for Unemployment 
Benefits in Washington 
The Employment Security Department (ESD) is the agency that 
administers the Employment Security Act.38 The ESD is, in turn, 
administered by a Commissioner39 who has the authority to delegate 
various ESD functions as necessary.40 
A worker who is separated from a job may apply for unemployment 
benefits by filing a claim with the ESD.41 The ESD then contacts the 
claimant and the claimant’s former employer to determine why the job 
32. Id. § 50.20.095. If claimants can prove that they are actually available for work, despite 
attending school, they may not be disqualified. Id. § 50.20.095(3). 
33. Id. § 50.20.044. 
34. Compare Unemployment Compensation Act, ch. 162, § 5(e), 1937 Wash. Sess. Laws 574, 
581–82 (codified as amended at PIERCE’S WASH. CODE ANN., tit. 6233, § 305(e) (1939)), with 
WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.090 (disqualifying claimants who are unemployed because of a strike or 
lockout). 
35. Compare Unemployment Compensation Act, ch. 162, § 5(b), 1937 Wash. Sess. Laws 574, 
580 (codified as amended at PIERCE’S WASH. CODE ANN., tit. 6233, § 305(b) (1939)) (standard-
based statute), with WASH. REV. CODE § 50.04.294 (rule-based statute). 
36. Compare Unemployment Compensation Act § 5(a), 1937 Wash. Sess. Laws at 580 (standard-
based statute), with WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b) (rule-based statute). 
37. The misconduct disqualification has undergone significant revision and is primarily based on 
rules rather than standards. In 2003, the legislature replaced the previous definition (“an employee’s 
act or failure to act in willful disregard of his or her employer’s interest where the effect of the 
employee’s act or failure to act is to harm the employer’s business”) with a list of rules. Act of June 
20, 2003, ch. 4, sec. 5, § 1, 2003 Wash. Sess. Laws 2d Spec. Sess. 2782, 2787 (codified at WASH. 
REV. CODE § 50.04.294). This change has had important effects on worker qualification for 
benefits. See, e.g., Daniels v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 168 Wash. App. 721, 731, 281 P.3d 310, 314–15 
(2012) (noting the differences between the statutes in denying the claimant benefits). However, 
discussing the effects of both disqualification provisions is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
38. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.08.010. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. § 50.12.020. 
41. Id. § 50.20.140; see also WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 192-110-005 (2010) (explaining how 
claimants can apply for benefits). 
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ended.42 After finishing its investigation, the ESD sends both parties an 
initial determination notice that explains whether the claimant will 
receive benefits.43 
To be eligible for benefits, claimants must have worked at least 680 
hours in their base years44 in qualifying employment.45 Claimants must 
also show that they are able to work, available to accept work, and 
actively seeking suitable work,46 and that their jobs did not end for a 
disqualifying reason.47 Disqualifying reasons include discharge for 
misconduct48 and voluntarily leaving work without good cause.49 
Any party that disagrees with the ESD’s initial determination has the 
right to appeal50 and to appear at a hearing in front of an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ).51 The ALJ conducts the hearing and issues an initial 
order.52 The initial order can be appealed to the Commissioner’s Review 
Office,53 which issues final agency decisions.54 The Commissioner can 
choose to publish some decisions, which gives them precedential value 
with the Commissioner’s Review Office and makes them binding on 
ALJs.55 All Commissioner’s decisions are subject to judicial review 
under Washington’s Administrative Procedure Act.56 
42. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 192-130-080 (2010); id. §§ 192-120-030, -040 (2004). 
43. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 50.20.140, 50.20.150, 50.20.180. 
44. Id. § 50.04.030; see also id. § 50.04.020 (generally defining “base year” as “either the first 
four of the last five completed calendar quarters or the last four completed calendar quarters”). 
45. See id. § 50.04.100 (defining “employment”). The Employment Security Act contains a 
general test for excepted employment. Id. § 50.04.140. It also excludes from coverage certain types 
of work. See id. §§ 50.04.148–50.04.275 (2012 & Supp. 2013) (excluding, for example, certain 
musicians, barbers, outside salespeople, newspaper carriers, and amateur sports officials). Part-time 
work is generally qualifying employment. See id. § 50.04.100 (2012). 
46. Id. § 50.20.010. 
47. Id. §§ 50.20.066, 50.20.050. 
48. Id. § 50.20.066; see also id. § 50.04.294 (defining “misconduct”). 
49. Id. § 50.20.050. 
50. Id. § 50.32.020. 
51. Id. § 50.32.010. 
52. Id. § 50.32.060; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 192-04-150 (2013). 
53. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.32.070. The Commissioner delegates the authority to consider 
petitions for review to the Commissioner’s Review Office. See id. § 50.12.020 (authorizing the 
Commissioner to “delegate . . . the right to decide matters placed in the commissioner’s discretion 
under this title”). For simplicity, and consistent with the practice of Washington courts, this 
Comment refers to decisions from the Commissioner’s Review Office as Commissioner’s decisions. 
54. Id. § 50.32.090.  
55. Id. § 50.32.095. 
56. Id. § 34.05.570 (2012). 
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II. RULES AND STANDARDS 
The American legal system is caught between two opposing views: 
one that “places a high premium on the creation and application of 
general rules,”57 and one that favors standards and “places a high 
premium on . . . case-by-case decisions, narrowly tailored to the 
particulars of individual circumstances.”58 Rule-based laws are arguably 
the more popular of the two.59 But for all its vogue, an “extravagantly 
rule-bound conception of the rule of law”60 ignores an important point 
about due process and justice: individual people with unique cases and 
circumstances deserve an opportunity to be heard.61 
This Part summarizes the differences between rules and standards. It 
also explains why rules are preferable in some legal contexts, while 
standards are preferable in others. Finally, it explains that the choice 
between rule- and standard-based laws reflects fundamental beliefs and 
important policy decisions about the proper roles of individuals, society, 
and the law. 
A. The Differences Between Rules and Standards 
Rules and standards are often compared as opposites. Rules are “hard 
and fast,” while standards are “open-ended.”62 Rules are “bright line[s],” 
while standards are “flexible.”63 Rules “specif[y] in advance” a legal 
response to an action, while standards allow an after-the-fact legal 
determination about whether the action is appropriate, under the 
circumstances.64 Two classic examples come from traffic laws: “do not 
57. Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 956 (1995). 
58. Id. at 956–57. 
59. Id. at 957 (discussing the “pervasive social phenomenon” of the fascination with rules). See 
generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989) 
(discussing the value of rules in the context of judge-made law). 
60. Sunstein, supra note 57, at 957. 
61. Id. at 958 (“[P]eople are entitled to argue that they are relevantly different from those that 
have come before, and that when their case is investigated in all its particularity, it will be shown 
that special treatment is warranted.”). This concept is discussed in infra Part IV.A.2. 
62. Sunstein, supra note 57, at 959. 
63. Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 379 (1985). Professor Schlag 
believes thinking of rules and standards as a simple dialectic is unsatisfactory. See id. at 399–426. 
However, for the purposes of this Comment, the simple distinction is sufficient. 
64. Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 101 
(1997). Of course, rules cannot perfectly “specify [all] outcomes before particular cases arise,” 
because “no approach to law is likely to avoid allowing at least some legal judgments to be made in 
the context of deciding actual cases.” Sunstein, supra note 57, at 961 (emphasis in original). 
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drive more than 60 miles per hour” is a rule, while “do not drive 
unreasonably fast” is a standard;65 “stop and look” at every railroad 
crossing is a rule, while “act with reasonable caution” is a standard.66 
Rules are advantageous when they are used to govern similar 
behavior that occurs in similar situations and that occurs very 
frequently.67 This frequency is the critical distinction: “the greater the 
frequency with which a legal command will apply, the more desirable 
rules tend to be relative to standards.”68 Examples of laws applied with 
frequency include traffic laws and the income tax code, both of which 
govern billions of incidents and transactions every year.69 However, 
frequency refers not to the absolute number of incidents, but to the 
“frequency of behavior with the relevant common elements.”70 
Therefore, even for transactions that occur many times each year, a rule 
is not necessarily preferable unless the transactions are almost identical. 
Additionally, rules may be preferable if they are designed to promote 
a particular set of perceived virtues and discourage a set of perceived 
vices.71 If policymakers determine that a law should promote “certainty, 
uniformity, stability, and security,”72 or neutrality, efficiency, and 
autonomy,73 a rule may serve those interests more suitably than a 
standard. 
However, rules are not well suited to meet every legal need. Instead, 
rules may be inappropriate because they promote intransigence, 
regimentation, and rigidity,74 or sclerosis, punitiveness, and 
compulsiveness.75 Rules are also bound to be over- and under-inclusive, 
65. Id. at 959. 
66. Schlag, supra note 63, at 379. 
67. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 563 
(1992) (“To illustrate the analysis, consider the problem of regulating the disposal of hazardous 
substances. For chemicals used frequently in settings with common characteristics—such as dry 
cleaning and automotive fluids—a rule will tend to be desirable.”). 
68. Id. at 577. 
69. See id. at 563–64. 
70. Id. at 600 (emphasis added). 
71. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1685, 1710 (1976) (listing examples of “[t]he different values that people commonly associate with 
the formal modes of rule and standard”); Schlag, supra note 63, at 399 (explaining that “the most 
common view of the rules v. standards dialectic ascribes one set of virtues and vices to rules and 
another set of virtues and vices to standards,” but noting that, in his opinion, that view is 
unsatisfactory). 
72. Schlag, supra note 63, at 400. 
73. See Kennedy, supra note 71, at 1710. 
74. Schlag, supra note 63, at 400. 
75. Kennedy, supra note 71, at 1710. 
 
                                                     
18 - Toler Comment.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2014  12:21 PM 
2014] WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE 567 
as well as unable to adapt to new circumstances.76 They also deprive 
decision-makers of the legitimate need for discretion and may unfairly or 
disproportionately affect particular social groups.77 In addition to these 
conceptual shortcomings, rules may fail as a practical matter because of 
“unanticipated developments” or because “they run up against 
intransigent beliefs about how particular cases should be resolved.”78 
Standards, by contrast, are more suitable when the law must address 
behavior that occurs “in settings that vary substantially,”79 or when a law 
applies to “heterogeneous behavior.”80 The classic example is the law of 
negligence: because it must govern “a wide array of . . . scenarios, many 
of which are materially different from each other,”81 its legal principles 
are standard-based (e.g., due care and reasonableness).82 
Standards also promote a particular set of virtues.83 Standards enable 
flexibility, evolution, tolerance, empathy, and equity,84 as well as 
“individuali[sm], open-endedness, and dynamism.”85 In addition to 
promoting these values, standards also allow individualized 
adjudications and give effect to the essential principle that “[c]ase-by-
case decisions are an important part of legal justice.”86 
Of course, like rules, standards are not perfect. Enabling flexibility 
and discretion does lead to risks of “the abusive exercise of discretion, 
lack of predictability or of the capacity to form expectations, high costs 
of decisions, [and] failure of political accountability.”87 And unbound, 
pure case-by-case decision-making is both undesirable and impossible.88 
But standards are neither hopelessly open-ended nor arbitrary; instead, 
76. Sunstein, supra note 57, at 992–94. But see Kaplow, supra note 67, at 586–96 (discussing the 
problem of inclusiveness and concluding that standards may not inherently be more effective at 
considering all relevant factors). 
77. Sunstein, supra note 57, at 992–96. 
78. Id. at 957. 
79. Kaplow, supra note 67, at 563. 
80. Id. at 564. 
81. Id. 
82. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 71, at 1688 (listing examples of standards, including “good 
faith, due care, fairness, unconscionability, unjust enrichment, and reasonableness”). 
83. Schlag, supra note 63, at 400. 
84. Kennedy, supra note 71, at 1710. 
85. Schlag, supra note 63, at 400. 
86. Sunstein, supra note 57, at 957. 
87. Id. at 958. 
88. See, e.g., id. at 957 (“Few if any judgments about particular cases are entirely 
particular. . . . Case-by-case particularism is not a promising foundation for law.”). See generally 
Scalia, supra note 59 (discussing the limitations of discretionary decision-making). 
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“standards will receive a degree of specification as they are interpreted, 
since officials may generate categories of cases that, under the standard, 
receive predictable treatment.”89 
B. A Legislature’s Choice Between Rules and Standards Reflects 
Important Policy Decisions About the Proper Relationship 
Between Individuals, Society, and the Law 
The distinction between rules and standards is not just abstract or 
academic.90 Instead, it is both pervasive and important: “[t]he 
controversy arises in every area of law; it often involves fundamental 
liberties.”91 When choosing whether to adopt a rule or a standard, 
legislators must consider the economic effects of their choice,92 
including how to allocate costs and benefits.93 Legislators must also 
respond to social norms, whether by embracing or rejecting those 
norms.94 
Perhaps more importantly, choosing whether to adopt a rule or a 
standard requires legislators to take sides in a fundamental conflict about 
the proper relationship between individuals, society, and the law—a 
conflict “between irreconcilable visions of humanity and society, and 
between radically different aspirations for our common future.”95 
Professor Duncan Kennedy described this conflict as one between 
individualism and altruism96—between self-interest and “self-reliance”97 
(often expressed by rules)98 on the one hand, and “sharing and 
89. Sunstein, supra note 57, at 965. 
90. Kennedy, supra note 71, at 1712 (“Thus the pro-rules and pro-standards positions are more 
than an invitation to a positivist investigation of reality. They are also an invitation to choose 
between sets of values and visions of the universe.”); id. at 1713–22 (describing how the 
rules-standards debate reflects a fundamental conflict between individualism and altruism). 
91. Sunstein, supra note 57, at 957 (footnotes omitted). 
92. See generally Kaplow, supra note 67 (analyzing the economic implications of rule- and 
standard-based laws). 
93. See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 73–74 
(1983) (identifying “[r]ate of [c]ompliance,” “[o]ver- and [u]nder-[i]nclusiveness,” “[c]osts of 
[r]ulemaking,” and the “[c]ost of [a]pplying a [r]ule” as “four principal subcategories of potential 
costs and benefits”). 
94. See Posner, supra note 64, at 107–13 (discussing the development of social norms and 
theoretical explanations for why and how legislators respond to those norms). 
95. Kennedy, supra note 71, at 1685. 
96. See id. at 1713–24. 
97. Id. at 1713. 
98. See id. at 1710 (listing values that rules promote, including “[s]elf-reliance”). 
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sacrifice”99 (often expressed by standards)100 on the other. 
In sum, the choice matters because it reflects fundamental beliefs 
about how society should be ordered—and about whether and how the 
law should intervene in that order. 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF GOOD CAUSE FOR LEAVING WORK 
The Employment Security Act has always disqualified claimants who 
voluntarily leave work without good cause from receiving 
unemployment benefits.101 However, the definition of good cause 
evolved significantly during the last seventy years. The 1937 Act was a 
quintessential standard that provided no definition of good cause102 and 
gave the agency and the courts broad discretion to interpret the phrase.103 
But as the legislature revised the statute, it consistently limited the 
circumstances that can constitute good cause and restricted 
administrative and judicial discretion to find it.104 
This Part traces the evolution of the voluntary quit statute through 
three main historical periods: 1945–1977, 1977–2003, and 2003–present. 
For each period, it summarizes relevant administrative and judicial 
decisions, describes the statutory language at the time, identifies 
important amendments to the statute, and discusses the effects of the 
amendments. Most importantly, it explains how the amendments 
redefined good cause, transforming a broad, flexible standard into a 
narrow, rigid rule. 
A. The Era of the Standard: 1945–1977 
The 1937 Act did not define good cause.105 However, in 1945, the 
legislature amended the Act and directed the agency to consider a 
number of factors when determining whether a claimant had good cause 
for leaving work:106  “the degree of risk involved to [the claimant’s] 
99. Id. at 1717. 
100. See id. at 1710 (listing values that standards promote, including “[e]mpathy,” “[t]olerance,” 
and “[c]ommunity”). 
101. Unemployment Compensation Act, ch. 162, § 5(a), 1937 Wash. Sess. Laws 574, 580 
(codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050 (2012)). 
102. Id. 
103. See infra Part III.A. 
104. See infra Parts III.B–C. 
105. Unemployment Compensation Act § 5(a), 1937 Wash. Sess. Laws at 580 (codified as 
amended at PIERCE’S WASH. CODE ANN., tit. 6233, § 305(a) (1939)). 
106. Act of Mar. 7, 1945, ch. 35, § 78, 1945 Wash. Sess. Laws 76, 116 (codified at WASH. REV. 
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health, safety, and morals, his physical fitness and prior training, . . . the 
distance of the available work from his residence,”107 and—
importantly—“such other factors as the Commissioner may deem 
pertinent.”108 This language granted the agency and the courts broad 
discretion to find good cause. 
The Commissioner’s first published decision interpreting good cause, 
In re Hurd,109 concerned the scope of that discretion. Earl Hurd left work 
in order to accept a new job.110 After Hurd quit, he learned that the new 
job was no longer available and filed a claim for unemployment 
benefits.111 The Commissioner noted that the circumstances that led 
Hurd to leave work were “elements not specifically described” in the 
statute.112 However, the Commissioner concluded that those 
circumstances were the sort of “other factors” the agency had discretion 
to consider.113 
The Commissioner114 and the courts115 also accepted that “certain 
personal reasons advanced by the particular claimant [can rise] to the 
stature of ‘good cause.’”116 To establish good cause, claimants had to 
show a “compelling personal reason”117 for leaving work. The 
Commissioner defined a compelling personal reason as “a predicament 
[in which the claimant] had no alternative but to immediately sever [the] 
employer-employee relationship,”118 or “circumstances of such a nature 
that left [the claimant] no alternative but to leave . . . employment.”119 
Through 1976, the agency and the courts had considerable discretion 
to find that a claimant quit for a compelling personal reason, and found 
good cause when the claimant left work: 
CODE § 50.05.11 (1946)). The Commissioner used these same factors to determine whether work 
was suitable for a claimant. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Hurd, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 114 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1954), 1954 WL 46417.  
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Zemek, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 326 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1956), 1956 WL 58119. 
115. In re Bale, 63 Wash. 2d 83, 385 P.2d 545 (1963) (holding that a claimant had good cause 
when she left work to join her husband, who had accepted a job in a different city). 
116. Zemek, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 326 (emphasis added). 
117. Morse, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 157 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1955), 1955 WL 47633. 
118. Tuai, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 162 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1955), 1955 WL 47638 
(emphasis in original). 
119. Jones, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 964 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1973), 1973 WL 166598. 
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• to preserve a marriage in the face of divorce,120 as long as 
there was a “serious threat to the marital relationship;”121 
• when both spouses could not be employed in the same area122 
(although women were more likely than men to establish 
good cause, under the theory that wives had a duty to follow 
their husbands, but not vice versa);123 
• to marry, if the fiancé/e was employed far from the 
claimant;124 
• to avoid suppression of “free expression of thought” about 
union activities;125 
• because the distance to the workplace from the claimant’s 
home was unreasonable126 or would result in hardship;127 
120. Haskins, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 512 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1962), 1962 WL 
76374; Seeley, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 165 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1955), 1955 WL 47641. 
121. Susinski, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1170 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1974), 1974 WL 
177539 (disqualifying the claimant because he left work to “insure the happiness and tranquility of 
his family, rather than to preserve the marriage”). 
122. Ayers v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 85 Wash. 2d 550, 552–53, 536 P.2d 610, 611–12 (1975) (“If 
employment for the husband and for the wife are not available in the same area, it is a compelling 
personal reason and, therefore, good cause for one of the spouses to leave employment and go to the 
place of employment of the other spouse in order to keep the family together. The decision as to 
which place of employment should be accepted . . . is generally a decision which the spouses should 
make for themselves, subject to the need to make a reasonable decision.”). But see Beckmeyer, 
Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 178 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1976), 1976 WL 183403 (holding 
that the claimant lacked good cause for leaving work to accompany a spouse when the move was 
voluntary, rather than as a result of a choice between competing offers of employment). 
123. Balcom, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 249 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1976), 1976 WL 
183474 (“The claimant protests what he feels to be the application of a ‘double standard,’ in that if 
the situation were reversed and his wife had quite [sic] her job to follow him to Chicago where he 
had a better job, benefits would be allowed to her. This is probably true . . . . There is, however, no 
corresponding duty on the part of a husband to accompany his wife and live at the home she has 
selected.” (citing In re Bale, 63 Wash. 2d 83, 91, 385 P.2d 545, 549 (1963))); see also Dickey, 
Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 293 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1977), 1977 WL 191836 (claimant, 
who left work to move with her husband, had good cause because “[t]he Bale rule does not 
encompass ‘reasonableness’ but only that a wife has a compelling personal reason to leave her 
employment to move with her husband to the home of his choice.”). 
124. Pedersen, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 811 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1970), 1970 WL 
118071. However, leaving work for marriage alone was not good cause. Id. 
125. Bittle, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 320 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1956), 1956 WL 58113. 
126. Leaving work due to distance was good cause when other circumstances weighed in favor of 
that conclusion. See, e.g., Stokesberry, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 980 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 
1973), 1973 WL 166614 (holding that claimant had good cause because his long commute was 
damaging his family relationships); Hatch, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 331 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. 
Dep’t 1956), 1956 WL 58124 (holding that claimant had good cause because his move in order to 
lead a religious congregation rendered his commute unreasonable). Sometimes distance alone was 
enough to establish good cause. See Hutchins, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 222 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. 
Dep’t 1955), 1955 WL 47697. But see Emmons, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1134 (Wash. Emp’t 
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• because of illness128—including illnesses such as stress and 
anxiety129—if the claimant first made “reasonable efforts to 
preserve” the job130 and provided medical documentation;131 
• because of the illness of a spouse132 or other family 
members,133 but only if it was necessary for the claimant to 
leave work and a leave of absence or other accommodation 
was unreasonable;134 
• after a union decertification election, rather than forfeit health 
and pension benefits;135 
Sec. Dep’t 1974), 1974 WL 177502 (holding that a claimant who lived in Tacoma did not have 
good cause for leaving work in Seattle because he possessed “an occupational skill unique to the 
aircraft industry,” which made work at Boeing’s Seattle location suitable). Eventually, the 
Commissioner identified four patterns of quit-due-to-distance cases and provided a framework for 
adjudicating each type. See Chitwood, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 305 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. 
Dep’t 1977), 1977 WL 191848. 
127. Watson, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 121 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1954), 1954 WL 46424 
(holding that claimant had good cause because his job was transferred to San Francisco and 
continuing work would lead to “extended absences from his family,” which would be an 
abandonment of his “domestic obligations”). 
128. See, e.g., Luby, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1155 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1974), 1974 
WL 177524 (holding that claimant, who worked in Alaska, had good cause because the climate 
caused him to suffer severe nosebleeds). A claimant who left work due to illness, or risk of illness, 
was generally required, “if the risk is one borne by all those employed in the occupation . . . to show 
that he was affected to a greater extent than the other workers in the same or similar occupation.” 
Yost, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1210 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1975), 1975 WL 175236 
(disqualifying claimant for failure to show additional effect). 
129. Martin, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 2d 265 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1976), 1976 WL 
183490. 
130. Pitsaroff, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1209 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1975), 1975 WL 
175235 (disqualifying claimant who left work due to risk of illness because he “did not make a 
reasonable effort to preserve his [employment] relationship by requesting consideration for a 
transfer”). 
131. Mallen, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1212 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1975), 1978 WL 
175238 (“[T]he severity and effect of medical and/or emotional problems are best judged on the 
basis of competent medical evidence.”). Luby, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1155, was an 
exception to the general rule that claimants must provide medical documentation advising them to 
leave work before they quit. 
132. Buxton, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 799 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1969), 1969 WL 
102130. 
133. Hopper, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 990 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1973), 1973 WL 
166624. 
134. Johnson, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1105 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1974), 1974 WL 
177473 (disqualifying claimant who left work to assist his ailing grandparents because he knew 
other relatives were coming to assist and, therefore, should have asked for a leave of absence until 
they arrived). 
135. Matison v. Hutt, 85 Wash. 2d 836, 839–40, 539 P.2d 852, 854 (1975) (recognizing as 
“compelling” the “jeopardy to [the claimants’] health and welfare benefits . . . [and] pension 
benefits,” and rejecting a categorical rule that would “deny[] benefits where the claimant’s personal 
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• to preserve a relationship with children136 or to provide child 
care, as long as the claimant tried to make other arrangements 
and leaving work was a last resort;137 and 
• because of a reasonable belief that a new job was available.138 
However, even if claimants established a compelling personal reason, 
they were still required to “do everything possible to retain the 
employer-employee relationship”139 before quitting. Often, they had to 
inform their employers about the personal reason and provide them an 
opportunity to address it.140 Claimants were also generally expected to 
“exhaust, or . . . at least explore all other avenues prior to quitting,”141 
unless no alternatives were reasonably available.142 
Compelling personal reasons were not the only way claimants could 
establish good cause. The Commissioner also found good cause for 
many work-related reasons not specifically addressed in the statute: 
• when a claimant’s work violated her moral or religious 
beliefs;143 
reasons for terminating unemployment are union related”). 
136. Wright, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1173 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1974), 1990 WL 
10049283. 
137. Odanovich, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1202 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1974), 1974 WL 
177570 (holding that claimant had good cause when she tried to, but could not, resolve her child 
care problem); see also Rogers, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1204 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1974), 
1974 WL 177572 (disqualifying claimant because he did not make “every reasonable effort to 
resolve the problem prior to summarily quitting his job”). But see Christie, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r 
Dec. 2d No. 262 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1976), 1976 WL 1838487 (holding that claimant had 
good cause when a new schedule created child care problems, even when she did not report those 
problems to her employer, because she was given an ultimatum: accept the new schedule or quit). 
138. Edquist, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 188 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1976), 1976 WL 
183413. 
139. Courtright, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 552 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1963), 1963 WL 
67420 (although domestic problems were a compelling personal reason, claimant lacked good cause 
because she did not give the employer an opportunity to preserve her job). 
140. See, e.g., id. However, the Commissioner rejected a categorical application of this rule, 
recognizing that, under some circumstances, claimants were not required to notify the employer or 
do everything possible to preserve the job. See, e.g., Conner, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 759 
(Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1968), 1968 WL 95764 (holding that claimant was not required to “do 
everything in his power to correct” his employer’s failure to pay him the minimum wage before 
leaving work). 
141. Jones, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 964 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1973), 1973 WL 166598. 
142. Cuvreau, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 993 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1973), 1973 WL 
166627 (claimant whose employer likely had no other work available had good cause for leaving 
work that aggravated his health condition, even though he did not request a transfer). 
143. Peters, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 377 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1978), 1978 WL 
209141 (disqualifying the claimant, who left work because she could not afford union dues, but 
observing that claimants had established good cause in “case[s] involving a sincere bonafide [sic] 
religious, personal, moral or secular belief of a clearly established and compelling nature”); 
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• when an employer refused to honor the terms of a contract;144 
• when a claimant’s hours were substantially reduced;145 
• when working conditions caused a claimant to suffer 
substantial embarrassment146 or frustration;147 and 
• for financial reasons, such as when the claimant had 
“substantial grounds for believing his wages will not be paid 
him when they are due,”148 when the employer did not pay 
minimum wage,149 or when there was a “manifest 
discrepancy” between the claimant’s wages and the prevailing 
wage.150 
The Commissioner and the courts also exercised discretion to identify a 
number of reasons for leaving work that did not constitute good cause: 
• a claimant’s desire to retire151 or collect social security 
benefits;152 
• a claimant’s desire to seek work with more favorable 
Holtzman, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 408 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1958), 1958 WL 59433 
(holding that a claimant whose religion prevented him from joining a labor organization had good 
cause for leaving a job that required him to join a union). The Commissioner did not analyze these 
cases as “compelling personal reasons” cases because the Act provided that work risking or 
violating a claimant’s morals could be unsuitable. See Act of Mar. 7, 1945, ch. 35, § 78, 1945 Wash. 
Sess. Laws 76, 116 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.100 (2012) (“In determining 
whether work is suitable for an individual, the commissioner shall also consider the degree of risk 
involved to the individual’s health, safety, and morals . . . .”)). 
144. Johnson, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 504 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1958), 1958 WL 
59352. 
145. Edquist, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 188 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1976), 1976 WL 
183413. 
146. Wageman, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1020 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1973), 1973 WL 
166654 (holding that claimant had good cause after quitting due to the employer’s “unprovoked 
outburst of profanity directed at the [claimant] under circumstances resulting in public 
embarassment [sic] and humiliation”). 
147. Markholt, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 361 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1977), 1977 WL 
191904 (holding that claimant had good cause when she “was given a certain degree of high 
responsibility without the concomitant control and authority to carry it out” and “was harassed by 
co-workers and not afforded opportunity for an uninterrupted lunch break”). 
148. Hilker, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 173 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1955), 1955 WL 47648. 
149. Conner, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 759 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1968), 1968 WL 
95764. 
150. Schully, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 213 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1955), 1955 WL 
47688. 
151. Taylor, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 862 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1971), 1971 WL 
129518. 
152. Wagner, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1141 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1974), 1974 WL 
177509. 
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wages153 or hours;154 
• a claimant’s dissatisfaction with working conditions155 or 
simple boredom;156 
• a claimant’s desire to attend school;157 
• a claimant’s desire to be self-employed;158 
• a claimant’s belief that he or she would be replaced,159 
discharged,160 or laid off;161 and 
• a claimant’s personality conflicts with a supervisor.162 
In sum, good cause determinations through 1976 were fact-specific 
and standard-based, and every case required the agency or the courts to 
exercise considerable discretion. However, beginning in 1977, the 
legislature began to restrict the scope of that discretion by moving 
toward an increasingly rule-based statute. 
153. Cowles Publ’g Co. v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 15 Wash. App. 590, 595–97 550 P.2d 712, 716–17 
(1976) (disqualifying claimant who left work because of “low wages and lack of promotional 
opportunity”). 
154. Pavlick, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 665 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1966), 1966 WL 88855 
(disqualifying claimant who quit because of “her personal desire to retire in order to seek work 
which would entail less [sic] nighttime hours”). 
155. Johnson, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1259 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1975), 1975 WL 
175283 (disqualifying claimant who quit because he believed that a more senior employee was 
“interfer[ing] with his job duties”); Dietz, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1060 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. 
Dep’t 1973), 1973 WL 166694 (disqualifying claimant who quit because of “dissatisfaction over 
working conditions and his feeling that the supervision was inadequate”); Hayner, Emp’t Sec. 
Comm’r Dec. No. 1013 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1973), 1973 WL 166647 (disqualifying claimant 
who quit because of dissatisfaction with having too little work); Sculati, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 
No. 1039 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1973), 1973 WL 166673 (“Nor do we consider that a failure to 
promote or transfer, coupled with a ‘hard’ job, is good cause for quitting . . . .”). 
156. Dinoia, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1115 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1974), 1974 WL 
177483. 
157. Stewart, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 948 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1973), 1973 WL 
166582. Under the current Act, claimants who leave work to attend an approved “apprenticeship 
program” are not disqualified. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(xi) (2012). 
158. Noble, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 345 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1957), 1957 WL 56218. 
159. Malinowski, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 655 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1966), 1966 WL 
88845. 
160. Smith, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. No. 1055 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1973), 1973 WL 
166689. 
161. Washburn, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 148 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1976), 1976 WL 
183373. 
162. Trumbull, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 245 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1976), 1976 WL 
183470. 
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B. Increased Legislative Intervention, but Broad Discretion Remains: 
1977–2003 
1. The 1977 Amendments 
In 1977, the legislature amended the Act. The amendments codified 
some of the Commissioner’s decisions, but also restricted the scope of 
administrative and judicial discretion to find good cause under some 
circumstances. 
In section 2(a), the legislature codified the Commissioner’s decisions 
holding that claimants who left work in reliance on a “bona fide job 
offer”163 had good cause.164 Similarly, in section 2(b),165 the legislature 
codified the Commissioner’s framework governing claimants who left 
work for medical reasons.166 Claimants had good cause for leaving work 
because of their own illnesses or disabilities, or those of their immediate 
family.167 Section 2(b) generally required claimants to pursue all 
reasonable alternatives before leaving work,168 but the Commissioner 
continued to recognize that they did not have to do so when it would 
have been futile—for example, when the work that caused the illness 
was the only work available to the claimant from the employer.169 
Sections 2(a) and (b) were the first rules that defined good cause. But 
the legislature did not abandon the standard-based approach. Instead, in 
section 3, the legislature retained the language granting the 
163. Act of May 16, 1977, ch. 33, sec. 4, § 73, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 229, 231 
(codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 50.20.050(1)(b)(i), 50.20.050(2)(b)(i) (2012)). 
164. See, e.g., Edquist, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 188 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1976), 
1976 WL 183413 (holding that claimant had good cause and noting the relevance of her belief that 
she had been offered a new job, based on her conversations and interviews with the prospective 
employer). Self-employment was not a bona fide job offer. Lewis, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 
563 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1979), 1979 WL 202705. 
165. Act of May 16, 1977, sec. 4, § 73, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st. Ex. Sess. at 231. 
166. Id.; see also supra notes 128–34 and accompanying text. 
167. Act of May 16, 1977, sec. 4, § 73, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st. Ex. Sess. at 231; see also 
Frank, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 457 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1978), 1978 WL 209231 
(refusing to require a need “to provide constant care” to a family member because the statute did not 
require it); Bergman, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 455 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1978), 1978 
WL 209229 (discussing the various requirements to establish good cause, including medical 
documentation).  
168. Act of May 16, 1977, sec. 4, § 73 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. at 231. 
169. See, e.g., Frasier, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 546 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1979), 
1979 WL 202688 (holding that claimant, who suffered a “nervous breakdown” as a result of 
teaching “groups of maladjusted students,” had good cause because the employer had no other work 
available that “would foreseeably be less stressful and less likely to produce a recurrence of his 
illness”). 
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Commissioner discretion,170 but limited that discretion to considering 
“other work connected factors.”171 Section 3 also limited the scope of the 
Commissioner’s discretion to find good cause when claimants left work 
because of distance.172 
However, section 3 did leave intact the agency’s and the courts’ 
discretion to find good cause when “other related circumstances would 
work an unconscionable hardship on the individual” or when there was a 
“substantial involuntary deterioration of the work.”173 The 
Commissioner exercised this discretion by disqualifying claimants for 
reasons not specifically enumerated in the statute174 and by finding good 
cause under circumstances not specifically enumerated—as long as the 
factors were work-connected.175 
170. Act of May 16, 1977, sec. 4, § 73, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. at 231–32. 
171. Id. at 232; see also Lewis, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 563 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 
1979), 1979 WL 202705 (discussing some of the limitations on “good cause” imposed by the 1977 
amendments). 
172. Act of May 16, 1977, sec 4, § 73, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. at 232 (“Good cause 
shall not be established for voluntarily leaving work because of its distance from an individual’s 
residence where the distance was known to the individual at the time he or she accepted the 
employment . . . .”). Even so, the Commissioner still found good cause in some limited 
circumstances. See Hargrove, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 580 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1979), 
1979 WL 202722 (when a claimant relied on public transportation and left work because her 
assigned shifts would require her to leave work when no public transportation was available), aff’d, 
No. 291408 (Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 30, 1981); Thelbert, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 528 
(Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1979), 1979 WL 202671 (when a claimant’s only means of transportation 
(a car) developed problems, and he was unable to repair it); Smith, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 
406 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1978), 1978 WL 209180 (when a claimant was to be transferred from 
Tacoma to Seattle and had “no reasonable alternatives to terminating her employment”); Cook, 
Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 389 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1978), 1978 WL 209163 (when a 
claimant was transferred from Bremerton to Seattle, which would have “require[ed] substantial 
commuting costs and additional commuting time by ferry and car”).  
173. Act of May 16, 1977, sec. 4, § 73, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. at 232. 
174. Hadley, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 553 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1979), 1979 WL 
202695 (disqualifying claimant who believed supervisor was incompetent because any 
incompetence did not “create[] adverse conditions which a reasonably prudent person could not 
abide”); Sprout, Empl. Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d 512 (1979) (disqualifying claimant who was 
dissatisfied with supervisor and wanted different work); Mulitauaopele, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 
2d No. 511 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1979), 1979 WL 202654 (disqualifying claimant who wished 
to join the ministry). 
175. See, e.g., Alexander, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 638-1 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 
1980), 1980 WL 344316 (holding that claimant who suffered racially motivated harassment had 
good cause); Atkinson, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 621 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1980), 1980 
WL 344299 (holding that claimant who suffered hazardous working conditions had good cause); 
Knutson, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 620 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1980), 1980 WL 344298 
(holding that claimant had good cause when her forty-hour-per-week position was reduced to forty-
eight hours in a six-week period); Price, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 547 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. 
Dep’t 1979), 1979 WL 202689 (holding that claimant facing a pay cut of thirty percent had good 
cause); Ritter, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 510 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1979), 1979 WL 
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Finally, the legislature added section 4, which disqualified claimants 
“whose marital status or domestic responsibilities caused [them] to leave 
employment.”176 This rule disqualified many claimants who might well 
have qualified under the previous standard. For example, section 4 
disqualified claimants who: 
• left work “due to marital difficulties and to follow his wife to 
Oregon”;177 
• left work because it “required long absences away from her 
home, which was disquieting to her husband, and rendered it 
impossible for her to properly care for their daughter”;178 
• left work because her mother died;179 
• received one day’s notice that she had to pick up her new 
adopted child, and left work to care for the baby after her 
requests for leave were refused;180 
• left work, as a single father of four, to provide guidance for 
his children, some of whom had experienced trouble in school 
or been arrested;181 
• had joint custody of her children—at least one of whom was 
“having emotional problems because of the separation from 
her mother”—and left work to be closer to them;182 
• moved because her ex-husband, against whom she had filed 
assault charges, had repeatedly threatened her and her 
children;183 and 
202653 (holding that claimant who left work after his supervisor “made slanderous statements about 
him and impugned his honesty” by falsely accusing him of stealing tools had good cause); Norris, 
Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 439 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1978), 1978 WL 209213 (holding 
that claimant who suffered sex discrimination had good cause); Groulx, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 
2d No. 431 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1978), 1978 WL 209205 (holding that an employer’s “fail[ure] 
to fulfull [sic] the terms of the contract of hire” was good cause).  
176. Act of May 16, 1977, sec. 4, § 73, 1977 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. at 232. 
177. Dwyer, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 411 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1978), 1978 WL 
209185. 
178. Alex, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 416 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1978), 1978 WL 
209190. 
179. Smith, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 487 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1979), 1979 WL 
202630. 
180. Rhoades, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 552 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1979), 1979 WL 
202694. 
181. Pierpont, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 573 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1979), 1979 WL 
202715. 
182. Cox, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 614 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1980), 1980 WL 
344292. 
183. Hopkins, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 648 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1980), 1980 WL 
344326, dismissed, No. 22710 (Wash. Super. Ct. Apr. 9, 1982). 
 
                                                     
18 - Toler Comment.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2014  12:21 PM 
2014] WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE 579 
• left work to follow her husband, who was employed outside 
her labor market.184 
However, despite section 4, the Courts of Appeals decided that the 
1977 amendments did not abrogate the prior definition of good cause.185 
In 1980, in Coleman v. Department of Employment Security,186 Division 
One of the Court of Appeals observed that the amendment limiting 
discretion to work-connected factors had no effect because “the key 
operative words” in the statute remained the same.187 Therefore, the 
court held that a claimant who left work after a co-worker assaulted her 
had a compelling personal reason and was not disqualified.188 
The next year, in Vergeyle v. Employment Security Department,189 the 
same court held that a claimant who left work in response to “the 
unreasonable conduct of the employer” had good cause.190 The court 
cited Coleman and explained that, “Washington case law has long 
recognized that good cause for leaving employment is not limited to 
work-connected factors . . . . This court recently held that the judicial 
definition of good cause was not abrogated by the [1977] amendments to 
the statute.”191 
Division Three of the Court of Appeals agreed. In Yamauchi v. 
Department of Employment Security,192 the court determined that a 
claimant who left work to marry her fiancé was disqualified—not 
because of section 4, but because she was not married when she left 
work.193 The court noted that the judicial definition of good cause 
included compelling personal reasons,194 then explained that, in its view, 
“[Section 4] was enacted by the legislature . . . to clarify compelling 
personal reasons which would qualify as good cause for voluntary 
184. Cournyer, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 651 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1980), 1980 WL 
344329. 
185. See Vergeyle v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 28 Wash. App. 399, 623 P.2d 736 (1981), review 
denied, 95 Wash. 2d 1021 (1981); Yamauchi v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 28 Wash. App 427, 624 P.2d 
197 (1981), rev’d, 96 Wash. 2d 773, 638 P.2d 1253 (1982); Coleman v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 25 
Wash. App. 405, 607 P.2d 1231 (1980). 
186. 25 Wash. App. 405, 607 P.2d 1231. 
187. Id. at 409 nn.1–2, 607 P.2d at 1233 nn.1–2. 
188. Id. at 409–10, 607 P.2d at 1233–34. 
189. 28 Wash. App. 399, 623 P.2d 736. 
190. Id. at 404, 623 P.2d at 739. 
191. Id. at 403, 623 P.2d at 739 (emphasis added) (citing Coleman, 25 Wash. App. 405, 607 P.2d 
1231). 
192. 28 Wash. App 427, 624 P.2d 197 (1981), rev’d, 96 Wash. 2d 773, 638 P.2d 1253 (1982). 
193. Id. at 432–34, 624 P.2d at 199–201. 
194. Id. at 430–31, 624 P.2d at 199. 
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termination of employment.”195 The court reasoned that, because “[t]he 
legislature is presumed to have in mind decisions of our Supreme Court 
when enacting statutes,” the 1977 amendments did not abrogate the prior 
definition of good cause.196 
Although the Washington State Supreme Court declined to review 
Vergeyle,197 it waded into the fray after Yamauchi.198 The Court 
reversed, in part because the Court of Appeals erred in holding that 
section 4 “must be read in light of prior judicial decisions.”199 The Court 
rejected the Court of Appeals’ characterization of the 1977 amendments: 
Section 4 . . . does not “clarify” good cause; it is an exception to 
good cause. The new statute is markedly different from its 
predecessor. It confines good cause to sections 1 through 
3 . . . . By creating [section 4] the legislature provided for 
different treatment of persons who voluntarily leave work for 
reasons of “marital status or domestic responsibilities”, such as 
the circumstances presented in Bale and Ayers that were 
previously treated as good cause cases.200 
Importantly, the Court’s decision in Yamauchi acknowledged that the 
1977 amendments had limited the scope of good cause.201 
2. The 1980 Amendments 
In 1980, the legislature amended the statute again. The legislature 
amended section 2(b), which already provided that claimants had good 
cause for leaving work because of illness or disability, or that of an 
immediate family member,202 to provide that the death of an immediate 
family member also established good cause.203 The legislature also 
amended the second part of section 2(b), which required claimants to try 
to preserve a job before quitting because of illness or disability,204 to 
provide that they did not have to do so if it would have been futile.205 
195. Id. at 432, 624 P.2d at 200. 
196. Id. 
197. 95 Wash. 2d 1021 (1981). 
198. 95 Wash. 2d 1026 (1981) (order granting review). 
199. Yamauchi v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec, 96 Wash. 2d 773,773, 776, 638 P.2d 1253, 1254 (1982). 
200. Id. at 776–77, 638 P.2d at 1255 (footnote omitted). 
201. See id. 
202. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b) (1979). 
203. Act of Mar. 6, 1980, ch. 74, sec. 5, § 73, 1980 Wash. Sess. Laws 170, 174 (codified as 
amended at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 50.20.050(1)(b)(ii), 50.20.050(2)(b)(ii) (2012)). 
204. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b) (1979). 
205. Act of Mar. 6, 1980, sec. 5, § 73, 1980 Wash. Sess. Laws at 174 (codified as amended at 
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The 1980 amendments also modified the “quit-due-to-distance” 
provision.206 Once again, the legislature restricted the scope of good 
cause: claimants had to show that “the distance [was not] customarily 
traveled by workers”207 in similar occupations. 
Finally, the amendments directed the Commissioner to determine not 
whether a work-connected factor leading a claimant to quit was an 
“unconscionable” hardship,208 but whether the hardship was 
“unreasonable.”209 
3. The 1981–1982 Amendments 
The 1981 amendments continued this trend of limiting discretion. 
Although the Act already specified that claimants had good cause if they 
left work “to accept a bona fide job offer,”210 the amendments added a 
list of factors the Commissioner was to consider in determining whether 
a job offer was in fact bona fide.211 
The next year, in 1982, the legislature further circumscribed the 
definition of good cause. Before the 1982 amendments, section 3 
directed the Commissioner to “consider the degree of risk involved to 
the individual’s health, safety, and morals, the individual’s physical 
fitness, the individual’s ability to perform the work, and such other work 
connected factors as the commissioner may deem pertinent.”212 The 
1982 amendments, however, directed the Commissioner to “only 
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 50.20.050(1)(b)(ii)(A), 50.20.050(2)(b)(ii)(A) (2012)); see also Christie, 
Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 262 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1976), 1976 WL 183487 (discussing 
the futility exception). 
206. Act of Mar. 6, 1980, sec. 5, § 73, 1980 Wash. Sess. Laws at 174. 
207. Act of Mar. 6, 1980, sec. 5, § 73, 1980 Wash. Sess. Laws at 174. 
208. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(3) (1979). 
209. Act of Mar. 6, 1980, sec. 5, § 73, 1980 Wash. Sess. Laws at 175. The Commissioner found 
unreasonable hardship when, for example, a claimant was required to “perform additional duties 
without pay,” Wright, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 814 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1990), 1990 
WL 10049283; when a claimant’s customary work in Bremerton was transferred to Texas, Wheat, 
Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 665 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1981), 1981 WL 394831; and when 
a claimant was required to do the work of two employees, Vickers, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 
657 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1981), 1981 WL 394823. 
210. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(a) (Supp. 1980). 
211. Act of Apr. 20, 1981, ch. 35, sec. 4, § 73, 1981 Wash. Sess. Laws 132, 135–36 (codified as 
amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(1)(a) (2012)) (directing the commissioner to consider 
factors including “the duration of the work,” “the extent of direction and control by the employer 
over the work,” and “the level of skill required for the work in light of the individual’s training and 
experience” when determining whether a job offer was bona fide). The new work could not be “a 
mere sham to qualify for benefits.” Id. at 135. 
212. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(3) (1981). 
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consider work-connected factors.”213 This amendment made it clear that 
only work-connected factors could establish good cause.214 
4. The 1993, 2000, and 2002 Amendments 
Between 1977 and 1993, the legislature struggled to decide whether 
claimants who left work because of their spouse’s employment had good 
cause.215 In 1993, the legislature amended the statute to provide that 
leaving work to move for a spouse’s employment is good cause.216 
However, the 2000 amendments restricted the scope of that “quit-to-
follow” rule and provided that claimants who quit to follow a spouse 
could only establish good cause if “the spouse’s employment [was] due 
to an employer-initiated mandatory transfer.”217 
Unlike the 2000 amendments, the 2002 amendments expanded the 
scope of circumstances that could constitute good cause.218 The 
legislature added a new section providing that claimants who left work 
to protect themselves or their families “from domestic violence . . . or 
stalking” had good cause.219 
5. Conclusions 
The voluntary quit statute evolved significantly from the open-ended 
1937 standard to the more rule-based approach that existed in 2000. 
Although a few of the amendments to the statute expanded the scope of 
administrative and judicial discretion, most narrowed it, as the 
legislature increasingly codified good cause. That trend culminated in 
2003, when the legislature enacted, for the first time, an enumerated list 
213. Act of Apr. 2, 1982, ch. 18, sec. 6, § 73, 1982 Wash. Sess. Laws 1st Ex. Sess. 1090, 1096 
(emphasis added) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(3) (Supp. 1982)). 
214. See Davis v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 108 Wash. 2d 272, 276, 737 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1987). 
215. Compare Cournyer, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 651 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 1980), 
1980 WL 344329 (no good cause), with Ayers v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 85 Wash. 2d 550, 536 P.2d 610 
(1975) (good cause). 
216. Act of May 17, 1993, ch. 483, § 8, 1993 Wash. Sess. Laws 2017, 2022 (codified as amended 
at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(iii) (2012)). The amendment established three 
requirements: the claimant must have left work “to relocate for the spouse’s employment”; the 
spouse’s employment must have been “outside the existing labor market area”; and the claimant 
must have “remained employed as long as was reasonable prior to the move.” Id. 
217. Act of Feb. 7, 2000, ch. 2, sec. 12, § 8, 2000 Wash. Sess. Laws 4, 16 (codified as amended at 
WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(1)(b)(iii)) (requiring that the claimant’s spouse be relocated because 
of a “mandatory military transfer”). 
218. Act of Mar. 12, 2002, ch. 8, sec. 1, § 12, 2002 Wash. Sess. Laws 32, 33 (codified at WASH. 
REV. CODE §§ 50.20.050(1)(b)(iv), 50.20.050(2)(b)(iv)). 
219. Id. 
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of good cause reasons. 
C. The Ascendance, Demise, and Resurrection of the Rule: 2003–
Present 
By the early 2000s, the good cause framework was well established: 
To have good cause for severing employment so as to be eligible 
for benefits, an employee must leave work primarily because of 
work-connected factors of such compelling nature as to cause a 
reasonably prudent person to leave, after exhausting all 
reasonable, non-futile alternatives. The commissioner must 
consider only work-related factors brought about by the 
employer.220 
However, in 2003, the legislature enacted a major revision to the 
Employment Security Act.221 As part of an effort to keep major 
employers in Washington,222 the legislature passed a bill that altered 
many important provisions of the Act: it removed the “liberal 
construction” language from the preamble,223 codified (for the first time) 
a largely rule-based definition of disqualifying misconduct,224 and (also 
for the first time) removed the language granting the Commissioner 
discretion to find good cause.225 Instead, the legislature replaced that 
language with an enumerated list of reasons that could constitute good 
cause.226 The new statute specified just ten reasons that would constitute 
good cause for leaving work: 
1. to “accept a bona fide offer of bona fide work”;227 
2. “because of the illness or disability of the claimant or the 
death, illness, or disability of a member of the claimant’s 
immediate family”;228 
220. Emps. of Intalco Aluminum Corp. v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 128 Wash. App. 121, 130, 114 P.3d 
675, 680 (2005). 
221. Act of June 20, 2003, ch. 4, 2003 Wash. Sess. Laws 2d Spec. Sess. 2782 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of WASH. REV. CODE §§ 50.01.05–50.98.110 (2012)). 
222. For an overview of the political context surrounding the 2003 amendments—particularly 
Boeing’s involvement in and effect on the legislation—see Deborah Maranville, Unemployment 
Insurance Meets Globalization and the Modern Workforce, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1129, 1139–
46 (2004). 
223. Act of June 20, 2003, sec. 1, § 2, 2003 Wash. Sess. Laws 2d Spec. Sess. at 2782–83. 
224. Id. sec. 5, § 1, at 2787; id. sec. 6, at 2787–88. 
225. Id. sec. 4, § 1 at 2784–87. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. at 2786 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(i) (2012)). 
228. Id. (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(ii)). Claimants still had to “pursue[] all 
reasonable alternatives to preserve his or her employment status . . . [unless that] would have been a 
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3. “to relocate for the spouse’s employment . . . due to a 
mandatory military transfer”;229 
4. “to protect the claimant or the claimant’s immediate family 
members from domestic violence . . . or stalking”;230 
5. because of a reduction in usual compensation of at least 
25%;231 
6. because of a reduction in usual hours of at least 25%;232 
7. because of a change in worksite that “caused a material 
increase in distance or difficulty of travel”;233 
8. because the “worksite safety deteriorated”;234 
9. because of “illegal activities in the . . . worksite”;235 and 
10. because the usual work “was changed to work that violates 
the individual’s religious convictions or sincere moral 
beliefs.”236 
The revised statute did not, however, state whether the new list was the 
exclusive list of reasons that could establish good cause.237 After these 
amendments, the Commissioner declined to decide whether the agency 
or the courts retained any discretion to find good cause for other 
reasons.238 And, as two cases239 wound their way through the agency and 
the courts, it became clear that the courts were also unsure. 
futile act.” Id. 
229. Id. (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(iii)). 
230. Act of June 20, 2003, sec. 4, § 1, 2003 Wash. Sess. Laws 2d Spec. Sess. at 2786 (codified at 
WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(iv)). 
231. Id. (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(v)). 
232. Id. (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(vi)). 
233. Id. (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(vii)). This subsection also required that 
the post-change “commute was greater than is customary for workers in the individual’s job 
classification and labor market.” Id. 
234. Id. (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(viii)). The subsection required that the 
claimant “reported such safety deterioration to the employer, and the employer failed to correct the 
hazards within a reasonable period of time.” Id. 
235. Id. (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(ix)). This subsection also required that 
the claimant “reported such activities to the employer, and the employer failed to end such activities 
within a reasonable period of time.” Id. 
236. Id. at 2787 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(x)). 
237. See id. 
238. See Krimbel, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 904 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 2005), 2005 
WL 5438407 (holding that claimant had good cause because she left work for medical reasons, but 
declining to explain whether the ten reasons were exclusive). 
239. Spain v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 164 Wash. 2d 252, 185 P.3d 1188 (2008); Starr v. Emp’t Sec. 
Dep’t, 130 Wash. App. 541, 123 P.3d 513 (2005), review denied, 157 Wash. 2d 1019, 142 P.3d 607 
(2006), overruled by Spain, 164 Wash. 2d 252, 185 P.3d 1188. 
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1. Starr Sounds the Death Knell of Discretion 
The courts first grappled with the 2003 amendments in 2005, when 
Division Two of the Court of Appeals decided Starr v. Employment 
Security Department.240 The court confronted an important question: 
whether the amended statute’s “list of non-disqualifying reasons for 
voluntarily leaving employment” was exclusive, or whether the 
Commissioner retained any discretion to find good cause for another 
reason.241 
In July 2003, Dennis Starr left his job to go to Alaska, where his 
daughters and grandchildren lived.242 One of his daughters had been in a 
“serious car accident” and was incarcerated; the other had been arrested 
and imprisoned for allegedly murdering her children’s father.243 Starr 
and his wife went to Alaska to take custody of their grandchildren.244 
When Starr filed his claim for unemployment benefits, the agency 
found he lacked good cause and disqualified him.245 As his case 
proceeded through the courts, his benefits were consistently denied 
because he left work for a reason not specifically listed in the statute.246 
When his case reached the Court of Appeals, the court affirmed and held 
that the amended statute “provides the exclusive list of good cause 
reasons for voluntarily quitting employment that will not disqualify a 
claimant from receiving unemployment compensation benefits.”247 
The Washington State Supreme Court denied Starr’s petition for 
review.248 Therefore, after Starr, claimants had good cause for leaving 
work only when they left for one of the ten reasons listed in the 
statute.249 
2. Spain Revives the Possibility of Discretion 
While Dennis Starr’s case was pending, another case presenting the 
same question—whether the statute provided an exclusive list of good 
240. Starr, 130 Wash. App. 541, 123 P.3d 513. 
241. Id. at 542–43, 123 P.3d at 515. 
242. Id. at 543, 123 P.3d at 515. 
243. Id. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. at 543–44, 123 P.3d at 515. 
246. Id. at 544, 123 P.3d at 515. 
247. Id. at 551, 123 P.3d at 519. 
248. Starr v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 157 Wash. 2d 1019, 142 P.3d 607 (2006) (order denying review). 
249. See Grater v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 137 Wash. App. 1013 (2007) (unpublished) (citing Starr, 
130 Wash. App. at 546, 123 P.3d at 519). 
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cause reasons—was proceeding through the courts.250 
Sara Spain quit her job in June 2004 because she “found [her 
employer] unbearable.”251 Her employer scolded her for “being too 
slow”;252 her employer subjected her and her co-workers to “verbal 
abuse . . . on a daily basis”253 (abuse which included profanity and being 
called “retards”254); and her employer would “kick [shelves] and throw 
things,”255 including boxes of nails and tools.256 On one occasion, 
dissatisfied with work her co-workers had performed, the employer 
forced Spain and her co-workers to stand outside “in the freezing cold 
for [about] three hours while he” berated them, telling them he “[hoped] 
it does rain so you guys can get soaked and miserable” and that he 
“[didn’t] give a shit . . . how you guys feel.”257 
The agency denied Spain benefits.258 However, the superior court 
reversed, holding that the list of reasons was not exclusive and that 
Spain had good cause.259 The agency appealed to Division Two of the 
Court of Appeals—the same court that, less than two years earlier, 
decided Starr.260 The court, citing Starr, reversed.261 Spain filed a 
petition for review in the Washington State Supreme Court,262 which the 
Court granted.263 
250. See Spain v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 162 Wash. 2d 1010, 178 P.3d 936 (2008) (order granting 
review). 
251. Id. at 255, 185 P.3d at 1189. 
252. Brief of Respondent at 4, Spain, 164 Wash. 2d 252, 185 P.3d 1188 (No. 79878-8). Although 
Spain was the petitioner in the Washington State Supreme Court, she was the respondent in the 
Court of Appeals. The same briefs were filed in both cases, and the party designations were not 
changed on the briefs. See id. at i. 
253. Id. at 2. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. at 3. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. at 3. 
258. Spain v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 137 Wash. App. 1005, 1005 (2007) (unpublished), rev’d, Spain, 
164 Wash. 2d 252, 185 P.3d 1188 (2008). 
259. Id. 
260. Starr v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 130 Wash. App. 541, 123 P.3d 513 (2005), review denied, 157 
Wash. 2d 1019, 142 P.3d 607 (2006), overruled by Spain, 164 Wash. 2d 252, 185 P.3d 1188. 
261. Id. 
262. See Spain v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 162 Wash. 2d 1010, 178 P.3d 936 (2008) (order granting 
review). 
263. Id. Spain was consolidated with another case, Batey v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 137 Wash. App. 
506, 154 P.3d 266 (2007), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Spain, 164 Wash. 2d 252, 185 P.3d 
1188. Kusum Batey was another claimant denied unemployment benefits; she challenged the 
constitutionality of the 2006 amendments under Washington’s “subject-in-title” requirement. See 
WASH. CONST. art. II, § 19. 
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Before the Court, the ESD argued that the 2003 amendments 
“removed discretion to determine good cause on a case-by-case basis” 
and that “[t]he Legislature established, in place of discretion, a discrete 
list of criteria that constitute good cause.”264 Spain argued that the list of 
good cause reasons in previous statutes had never been considered an 
exclusive list, so the new list should not be considered exclusive, 
either.265 Spain also emphasized the legislature’s mandate that the Act be 
given a liberal construction,266 arguing that “[r]eading the statute as 
permitting ten and only ten good causes for quitting one’s job is just the 
sort of pinched reading the legislature”267 had rejected in the past.268 
The Court unanimously agreed with Spain. Noting that the “statute is 
not a model of clarity,”269 the Court observed that the plain language did 
not limit the qualifying reasons to those enumerated in the statute.270 The 
Court also rejected allegations about the legislature’s purpose271 and 
found support for both positions in the legislative history.272 Ultimately, 
the decision turned on the plain language of the statute: the legislature 
simply did not make the list of reasons exclusive273—which, as the 
Court noted, would have been quite easy.274 
The decision overruled Starr and authorized the agency and the courts 
to continue exercising what little discretion they retained after the 2003 
amendments. But the legislature disagreed, and the next year, it revisited 
the disqualification statute. 
3. The Legislature Strikes Back: The Abrogation of Spain 
The Washington State Supreme Court issued its decision in Spain on 
264. Appellant’s Brief at 6, Spain, 164 Wash. 2d 252, 185 P.3d 1188 (No. 79878-8). 
265. Brief of Respondent, supra note 256, at 18. 
266. Id. at 22–25. 
267. Id. at 22–23. 
268. See Act of Apr. 22, 2005, ch. 133, sec. 2, § 1, 2005 Wash. Sess. Laws 376, 377 (codified at 
WASH. REV. CODE § 50.01.010 (2012)) (restoring the mandate that the statute be “liberally 
construed”). 
269. Spain, 164 Wash. 2d at 257, 185 P.3d at 1190. 
270. Id. at 257–59, 185 P.3d at 1190–91. 
271. Id. at 259, 185 P.3d at 1191 (rejecting the assertion “that the statutory list was intended to be 
exclusive and that exclusivity was the finishing stroke of a multi-year public policy compromise 
between business and labor over the nature of the Unemployment Insurance system” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
272. Id. at 259, 185 P.3d at 1191–92. 
273. Id. at 258–60, 185 P.3d at 1191–92. 
274. Id. at 259, 185 P.3d at 1191. 
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June 19, 2008.275 Less than three months later, Lehman Brothers 
collapsed and ushered in the global financial crisis of 2008.276 As the 
crisis unfolded, a series of other major banks imploded, and global 
“markets ground to a terrifying halt.”277 Unemployment also 
skyrocketed.278 In Washington, the unemployment rate rose almost 2%, 
from 5.1% to 7.0%, in the last three months of 2008 alone.279 Through 
2009, the unemployment rate continued to rise: it hovered around 9% for 
most of the year, but by December 2009, it had reached 10.3%.280 
Despite these catastrophic effects, the legislature’s agenda for 2009 
included a bill to abrogate Spain and remove the last vestiges of 
discretion.281 
In February 2009, thirteen state senators introduced Senate Bill 
5963.282 The bill, among other things,283 proposed an amendment to the 
voluntary quit statute.284 This amendment would specify that the reasons 
enumerated in the statute were the only reasons that could constitute 
good cause for leaving work.285 
Both the House Committee on Commerce & Labor and the Senate 
Committee on Labor, Commerce & Consumer Protection held public 
hearings on the proposed legislation.286 The business community argued 
275. Id. at 252, 185 P.3d at 1188. 
276. See, e.g., Thomas Ferguson & Robert Johnson, Too Big to Bail: The “Paulson Put,” 
Presidential Politics, and the Global Financial Meltdown: Part I: From Shadow Financial System 
to Shadow Bailout, 38 INT’L J. POL. ECON. 3, 4 (2009). 
277. Id. 
278. See, e.g., James Marschall Borbely, U.S. Labor Market in 2008: Economy in Recession, 
MONTHLY LAB. REV., March 2009, at 3–4. 
279. Local Area Unemployment Statistics, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-
bin/dsrv?la (select “Washington” and click “Next form”; then select “Statewide” and click “Next 
form”; select “Washington” and click “Next form”; select “unemployment rate” and click “Next 
form”; select “Not Seasonally Adjusted” and click “Next form”; then click “Retrieve data”) (last 
visited at Apr. 30, 2014). 
280. Id. 
281. See Substitute S.B. 5963, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009). Its companion bill was House 
Bill 2204. See H.B. 2204, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009). 
282. Substitute S.B. 5963. 
283. The bill also aimed to bring Washington law into conformity with federal requirements, to 
modify how employers’ unemployment insurance taxes are charged, and to modify the quit-to-
follow provision to allow a claimants to establish good cause if they quit because of a spouse or 
domestic partner’s work outside their labor market area. See id. 
284. Id. (“Good cause reasons to leave work are limited to reasons listed in (b) of this 
subsection.”). 
285. See id. 
286. See An Act Relating to Unemployment Insurance: Hearing on S.B. 5963 Before the S. 
Comm. on Labor, Commerce & Consumer Protection, 61st Leg. Sess. (Wash. 2009), 
 
                                                     
 
18 - Toler Comment.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/6/2014  12:21 PM 
2014] WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE 589 
that the bill would simply “recodif[y] the agreement that was made in 
2003 and has been thrown out by the courts,”287 while worker advocates 
explained that, because of the sheer variety of circumstances that lead 
people to leave work, the agency and the courts needed discretion to find 
good cause for reasons not enumerated in the statute.288 
Notwithstanding those advocates’ concerns, the legislature passed the 
bill on April 26, 2009.289 Since the law took effect on September 6, 
2009, Washington workers can only establish good cause for voluntarily 
leaving work for the eleven reasons listed in the statute290—no matter 
how compelling the circumstances, no matter how unreasonable the 
hardship. 
IV. WASHINGTON SHOULD RETURN TO A STANDARD-
BASED APPROACH TO DETERMINE GOOD CAUSE FOR 
LEAVING WORK 
This Comment argues that Washington should adopt a standard-based 
approach to finding good cause for leaving work. This Part advances 
three arguments: (A) in the context of work and of Washington’s 
unemployment compensation laws, a standard is more theoretically 
sound; (B) the rule has disqualified workers who left work for reasons 
consistent with the Employment Security Act; and (C) a standard is 
necessary to give effect to the purpose of the Act and of unemployment 
compensation generally. 
A. In the Context of Work and Unemployment Compensation, a 
Standard Is More Theoretically Sound than a Rule 
As Part II explained, rules are better suited to governing homogenous, 
repetitive behavior with little variation.291 By contrast, standards are 
better suited to governing circumstances that vary significantly and 
http://www.tvw.org/index.php?option=com_tvwplayer&eventID=2009021169. 
287. See, e.g., id. (statement of Trent House, State Manager of Government Relations for the 
Boeing Company). 
288. See, e.g., id. (statements of Pam Crone, Northwest Women’s Law Center, and Bob Abbott, 
Washington and Northern Idaho District Council of Laborers). 
289. Substitute S.B. 5963, 61st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009), Act of May 14, 2009, ch. 493, 
2009 Wash. Sess. Laws 2622 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050 (2012)). 
290. See WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b). Although the 2003 amendments specified just ten 
reasons that constitute good cause, the legislature added an eleventh reason—leaving work to enroll 
in an approved training program—in 2008. Act of April 1, 2008, ch. 323, sec. 1, § 2, 2008 Wash. 
Sess. Laws 1690, 1693 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(xi)). 
291. See supra Part II.A. 
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cannot often or reliably be anticipated in advance.292 Because 
employment relationships (and the reasons they end) vary significantly, 
the agency and the courts can make fair decisions about good cause only 
if they can make individualized, fact-specific determinations. 
Additionally, because the usual rationales for rules do not justify their 
use in Washington’s unemployment compensation system, a standard is 
more theoretically sound in this context. 
1. Workers’ Reasons for Leaving Work Vary Significantly and 
Require Individualized, Fact-Specific Determinations 
As any worker can attest, every job is different—and workers’ 
reasons for leaving a job vary significantly. For example, in just two 
years, the Commissioner confronted a variety of reasons leading 
claimants to leave work:293 
• quitting as a term of an agreement settling the claimant’s 
lawsuit against the employer, alleging harassment, 
discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful termination;294 
• quitting to follow a spouse, a certified Swiss watchmaker, to 
Montana, where he would be the only certified Swiss 
watchmaker;295 
• quitting after the employer failed to provide a paycheck, 
despite the claimant’s repeated requests;296 
• quitting to move from Massachusetts to join a new spouse 
who was employed in Bremerton;297 
• quitting to move to Phoenix to support and protect a daughter 
who was having legal problems and who was being abused by 
her boyfriend;298 and 
292. See supra Part II.A. 
293. These examples are from Commissioner’s Decisions published in 2010 and 2011. However, 
in these two years, the Commissioner received 2,618 appeals in voluntary quit cases—each of 
which undoubtedly presented its own unique circumstances. E-mail from Robert Page, Public 
Records Officer, Wash. State Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, to author (Mar. 13, 2013, 4:46 PM PDT) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter E-MAIL FROM ROBERT PAGE]. 
294. McPherson, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 978 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 2011), 2011 WL 
8129813. 
295. Mapelli, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 975 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 2011), 2011 WL 
8129812. 
296. Lauzon, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 958 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 2010), 2010 WL 
6795724. 
297. Gray, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 955 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 2010), 2010 WL 
6795721. 
298. Rivera, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 959 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 2010), 2010 WL 
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• quitting because an employer required the claimant to begin 
purchasing his own work supplies, which he could not 
afford.299 
The cases discussed in Part III300 also demonstrate that a person may 
leave work for an almost endless list of reasons. 
Determining whether those reasons constitute good cause is 
necessarily fact-intensive and case-specific. Recognizing this reality, 
before the 2003 amendments, neither the agency nor the courts had ever 
applied a rule to determine whether good cause existed.301 Instead, they 
recognized that such determinations could only be fairly resolved by 
applying standards.302 As the Washington State Supreme Court 
explained, “Good cause . . . is not susceptible of an exact definition. 
Rather, the meaning of these words must be determined in each case 
from the facts of that case.”303 That rationale is still justified today. 
Employment relationships and job separations are every bit as varied as 
they were when the agency and the courts were free to exercise 
discretion to find good cause. The rule, which eliminates that discretion, 
is not theoretically sound. 
Moreover, because rules cannot respond effectively to individual 
cases, the rule-based statute threatens claimants’ due process rights. 
Every claimant is already entitled to a hearing to explain how the law 
should apply to the facts of his or her case.304 But that modicum of 
procedural justice does not adequately protect a claimant’s right to due 
process.305 Instead, there is another concept that animates due process: 
people should be allowed not merely to test the application of 
law to fact, but also to urge that their case is different from those 
that have gone before, and that someone in a position of 
6795725. 
299. Eichelberg, Emp’t Sec. Comm’r Dec. 2d No. 946 (Wash. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t 2010), 2010 WL 
6795712. 
300. See supra Part III. 
301. See, e.g., Matison v. Hutt, 85 Wash. 2d 836, 839, 539 P.2d 852, 854 (1975) (refusing to 
apply a rule to determine good cause, noting that “[s]uch inflexibility would be unreasonable” and 
lead to unfair anomalies). 
302. See, e.g., Nielsen v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, 93 Wash. App. 21, 42, 966 P.2d 399, 409 (1998) 
(“The proper test is what a reasonably prudent person would do in similar circumstances.”); Hussa 
v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 34 Wash. App. 857, 863, 664 P.2d 1286, 1289–90 (1983) (“Generally, good 
cause for leaving employment requires a person meet the test of what an ordinarily prudent person 
would have done under the circumstances.”). 
303. Matison, 85 Wash. 2d at 838–39, 539 P.2d at 853–54 (quoting Saulls v. Emp’t Sec. Agency, 
377 P.2d 789, 793 (Idaho 1963)). 
304. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.32.020 (2012). 
305. See Sunstein, supra note 57, at 995. 
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authority ought to be required to pay heed to the particulars of 
their situation.306 
The United States Supreme Court recognized this concept in its 
“irrebuttable presumption doctrine,” which the Court applied to prohibit 
legislative classifications that are over- or under-inclusive, unless the 
affected group has the opportunity to rebut the presumption that it is 
actually within the scope of the classification.307 The Court relied, at 
least in part, on that doctrine to invalidate a variety of statutes that 
denied people the opportunity to explain that they were not properly 
encompassed by the rules that had been applied to them.308 For example, 
a state could not categorically deny unwed fathers custody of their 
children without providing them an opportunity to explain that, despite 
the rule presuming they were unfit parents, they were—in their 
individual cases—capable of parenting.309 In the context of the voluntary 
quit statute, this understanding of due process requires that claimants 
have the opportunity to argue that, even if their reasons for leaving work 
are not expressly contemplated by the rule, those reasons nevertheless 
constitute good cause—that the rule, as applied to them, is unfairly 
under-inclusive.310 
This Comment does not argue that Washington’s current rule-based 
statute is unconstitutional.311 However, the concept of due process 
reflected by the irrebuttable presumption doctrine does suggest that, 
when people are governed by rigid rules, they have an important interest 
in proving that those rules do not adequately address their situations. The 
306. Id. at 996. 
307. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 285–
89 (1975). 
308. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647–48 (1974) (holding 
unconstitutional administrative regulations that automatically prohibited teachers from working 
after a fixed month of pregnancy); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542–43 (1971) (holding 
unconstitutional a statute that automatically suspended a driver’s license after an accident without 
giving the driver the opportunity to prove he was not at fault); Tribe, supra note 307, at 285 n.49 
(collecting cases). 
309. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656–58 (1972). 
310. The fact that claimants have the right to a hearing, see WASH. REV. CODE § 50.32.020 
(2012), is not enough. To protect claimants’ due process rights, hearing officers and other 
adjudicators must have the authority to find that claimants’ circumstances constitute good cause—
authority the current rule precludes. See id. § 50.20.050(2)(a) (“Good cause reasons to leave work 
are limited to reasons listed in (b) of this subsection.”). 
311. The Court has declined to extend the irrebuttable presumption doctrine. See Weinberger v. 
Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 768–74 (1975) (distinguishing the previous cases relying on the doctrine and 
questioning its applicability); Sunstein, supra note 57, at 996 n.156 (noting the doctrine was “short-
lived”). However, the cases relying on the doctrine have not been overruled. See Weinberger, 422 
U.S. at 768–74 (distinguishing, but not overruling, cases). 
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current rule precludes any decision-maker from vindicating that 
interest.312 Particularly in the context of unemployment compensation, 
where individual circumstances vary wildly and the need for benefits is 
often acute, it is theoretically unsound and fundamentally unfair to deny 
claimants the right to a truly individualized adjudication. 
2. Many of the Usual Rationales for Rules Do Not Justify Their Use 
in Washington’s Voluntary Quit Statute 
Defenders of rules invoke many rationales. Some of these rationales 
are that rules minimize the cost of making decisions in individual 
cases,313 have “simplifying effects,”314 and reduce the likelihood of 
arbitrary or biased decision-making.315 However, the current rule-based 
approach to good cause does not advance those purposes; instead, it is 
often at odds with them. 
First, the rule does not minimize costs. One reason rules may limit 
costs in some contexts is that they reduce the need to “compil[e] 
information.”316 But that rationale is inapplicable in the context of 
Washington’s unemployment compensation system. Every time a 
claimant files for unemployment benefits after quitting a job, the ESD 
must determine whether he or she had good cause.317 The ESD must 
offer both the claimant and the employer the opportunity to be 
interviewed about the job separation.318 That was true before the 2003 
amendments,319 and it remains true now.320 The rule did not reduce the 
costs of compiling information. 
Second, if a rule actually has “simplifying effects,”321 it will 
presumably reduce the need for extensive adjudication.322 But the 
current rule does not reduce that need. Aggrieved parties, whether 
claimants or employers, are entitled to appeal every level of agency 
312. See WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(a) (“Good cause reasons to leave work are limited to 
reasons listed in (b) of this subsection.”). 
313. Kaplow, supra note 67, at 570; Sunstein, supra note 57, at 972–74. 
314. Sunstein, supra note 57, at 972. 
315. Id. at 974–75. 
316. Id. at 973. 
317. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 192-120-030 (2004). 
318. Id. § 192-130-080 (2010); id. §§ 192-120-030, -040 (2004).  
319. See id. §§ 192-120-030, -040 (2001). 
320. See id. § 192-130-080 (2010); Id. §§ 192-120-030, -040 (2004). 
321. Sunstein, supra note 57, at 972. 
322. See id. at 973. 
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decision about whether a claimant has good cause for leaving work.323 
The rule has not reduced the need for the Commissioner to review 
appeals in voluntary quit cases. Data from the ESD show that roughly 
the same percentage of appeals were filed before and after the 2003 
amendments:324 
 
Year Total number 
of voluntary 
quit claims 
Voluntary quit 
appeals to 
Commissioner 
Percentage of 
claims appealed 
2000 35,099 535 1.52% 
2001 46,721 901 1.93% 
2002 53,915 1340 2.49% 
2003 50,276 1203 2.39% 
2004 46,384 1095 2.36% 
2005 41,850 944 2.26% 
2006 41,162 792 1.92% 
2007 41,456 711 1.72% 
2008 43,606 587 1.35% 
2009 52,821 1065 2.02% 
2010 55,818 1486 2.66% 
2011 44,798 1132 2.53% 
2012 40,119 977 2.44% 
 
Although there was a slight reduction in appeals after the 2003 
amendments, any such reduction disappeared by 2009.325 If the rule 
actually provided clarity, as proponents of rules suggest, it would have 
reduced the need for appeals.326 These data show that it did not. 
Third, the rule does not inherently reduce the risk of arbitrary or 
biased decision-making. Instead, by requiring the agency and the courts 
to focus on just eleven reasons that can constitute good cause, the rule 
requires them to ignore other factors that would prompt a reasonable 
person to leave work. That is, the rule “make[s] irrelevant features of 
cases that might turn out, on reflection by people making particular 
judgments, to be relevant indeed.”327 By prohibiting the agency and the 
323. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.32.020 (2012). 
324. E-MAIL FROM ROBERT PAGE, supra note 293. 
325. Id. 
326. See Sunstein, supra note 57, at 973. 
327. Id. at 975. 
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courts from considering all the circumstances related to a claimant’s 
decision to leave work, the rule requires them to make determinations 
based on imperfect or incomplete information. That prohibition creates a 
certain amount of arbitrariness. 
In fact, in some cases, the rule actually requires arbitrary decision-
making. For example, the rule provides that claimants who quit because 
their hours are reduced by at least 25% have good cause for leaving 
work.328 Under this rule, claimants who quit because their hours are 
reduced by 24% are disqualified—even though a reduction of just 1% 
more would be good cause.329 That is the hallmark of arbitrariness, but it 
is what the rule requires. 
Additionally, the current rule actually creates bias against at least one 
social group: women. As required by Washington’s then-governor Gary 
Locke, who expressed “concerns . . . about the unforeseeable nature of 
some of the practical effects of [the 2003] amendments,”330 the ESD 
studied the effects of those amendments.331 The studies showed, among 
other findings discussed below in Part IV.B, that women were 
disproportionately disqualified under the new law.332 Women were 
denied benefits 12% more frequently than they had been under the 
standard.333 The study noted that women were often denied after leaving 
work because of “domestic or marital responsibilities,” including “losing 
child care; relocating because of a spouse’s job transfer; [and] relocating 
to marry.”334 This disproportionate burden on women is a result of the 
2003 amendments, as the rules simply forbid the agency and the courts 
from considering factors that are often of particular significance to  
 
328. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050(2)(b)(vi). 
329. See id. 
330. Letter from Gary Locke, Governor, State of Wash., to the Senate of the State of Wash. (June 
20, 2003), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/documents/billdocs/2003-04/Pdf/Bills/Vetoes/ 
Senate/6097.VTO.pdf. 
331. WASH. STATE EMP’T SEC. DEP’T, VOLUNTARY QUIT DECISIONS IN THE UNEMPLOYMENT 
INSURANCE PROGRAM: BEFORE AND AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF SECOND ENGROSSED SENATE 
BILL 6097, at 9–10 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 ESD STUDY], available at 
http://www.leg.wa.gov/JointCommittees/UITF/Documents/12-01VoluntaryQuitStudy.pdf; WASH. 
STATE EMP’T SEC. DEP’T, VOLUNTARY QUITS: DECEMBER 2006 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 ESD 
STUDY], available at http://www.esd.wa.gov/newsandinformation/legresources/uistudies/vol-quits-
2006.pdf. 
332. See 2006 ESD STUDY, supra note 331, at 4. 
333. Id. at 3. (from July 1, 2004 through June 30, 2005, almost 2000 women were denied benefits 
under the new rule, even though they would have qualified under the old standard). 
334. Id. at 4. 
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women.335 In this way, the rule actually produces, rather than eliminates, 
bias. 
B. The Rule Disqualifies Claimants Who Leave Work for Reasons 
Consistent with the Purpose of the Employment Security Act 
The rule-based statute is also inappropriate because it disqualifies 
workers who, in standard-based adjudications, would be able to establish 
good cause because they left work for reasons consistent with the 
purpose of the Employment Security Act.336 The study required by then-
governor Locke shortly after the 2003 amendments demonstrates that the 
amendments’ primary effect was to reduce the number of claimants who 
qualified for benefits.337 The ESD provided two studies: one focused on 
16,825 claims filed between July and December 2004 (“the 2005 
Study”);338 the other focused on 31,162 claims filed between July 1, 
2004 and June 30, 2005 (“the 2006 Study”).339 
The 2005 Study concluded that, under the new rule, 73% of claimants 
who voluntarily quit were found to lack good cause; under the old 
standard, that number would have been 61%—a difference of 12%.340 
That is, 1,989 claimants who would otherwise have received benefits 
were disqualified because of the rule.341 This burden, as discussed in 
Part IV.A.2, fell disproportionately on women: almost 14% more women 
were disqualified because of the rule, while less than 10% more men 
were disqualified.342 
The 2005 Study also described the circumstances of some claimants 
who would have qualified under the standard but were disqualified under 
the new rule.343 The following are representative examples:344 
335. See id. (“This may be explained by the fact that domestic and marital responsibilities 
predominantly fall to women in a household and when these responsibilities do not constitute good 
cause under voluntary quit laws, women stand to be denied at a greater rate than men.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
336. 2005 ESD STUDY, supra note 331, at 8–10. 
337. Id. at 7 (“1,989 decisions denied UI benefits to individuals for reasons that would have been 
allowed under the old law”); 2006 ESD STUDY, supra note 331, at 3 (“10.5 percent more people 
would have been granted benefits under the old law”). 
338. 2005 ESD STUDY, supra note 331, at 1. 
339. 2006 ESD STUDY, supra note 331, at 5. 
340. 2005 ESD STUDY, supra note 331, at 1. 
341. Id. 
342. Id. at 6. 
343. See id. at 9–10. 
344. See id. 
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• a claimant whose wages or hours were reduced by less than 
25%, even though that reduction still imposed an 
“unreasonable hardship” and was a “substantial involuntary 
deterioration” of the claimant’s work;345 
• abusive workplace conditions, such as profane language and 
bullying, that were not decent but were not actually illegal;346 
• a claimant whose employer required him to drive 150 miles 
every day; initially, the claimant was given a company 
vehicle, but the employer ultimately told the claimant to drive 
his own vehicle and did not compensate him for wear and 
tear;347 
• claimants who quit to relocate because of a spouse’s transfer, 
if the spouse was not employed by the military;348 and 
• claimants who quit to care for children for any reason other 
than illness or disability, including losing child care or trying 
to help a child avoid expulsion from school.349 
The 2006 Study substantially corroborated these findings.350 Of the 
roughly 31,000 people who filed claims after voluntarily leaving work, 
75.2% were found to lack good cause under the new rule; just 64.7% 
would have been disqualified under the standard.351 This difference of 
10.5% meant that around 3300 unemployed people were denied benefits 
as a result of the new rule, even though they left work for reasons 
consistent with the purpose of the Employment Security Act.352 Older 
claimants, aged fifty-five years and older, were affected more seriously 
than other age groups: they were denied benefits around 11% more 
frequently than they would have been under the standard.353 Similarly, 
women were more seriously affected than men.354 They were denied 
12% more frequently, while men were denied around 9% more 
frequently than they would have been under the standard.355 
There is no mistaking the data. The 2003 amendments reduced the 
345. Id. at 9. 
346. Id. 
347. Id. 
348. Id. 
349. Id. 
350. See 2006 ESD STUDY, supra note 331, at 3. 
351. Id. at 3. 
352. Id. 
353. Id. at 11. 
354. Id. at 3. 
355. Id. at 3, 11. 
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number of workers who could establish good cause, even though they 
left work for reasons consistent with the purpose of the Act. By 
replacing the standard with the rule, the amendments denied benefits to 
almost 3300 people who would otherwise have received benefits, at least 
initially.356 Stranding more than three thousand workers without the aid 
of unemployment benefits does not advance the purpose of the Act.357 
Instead, the rule thwarts that purpose. By denying the agency and the 
courts discretion to interpret good cause, the new rule deprives people of 
the benefits they need to survive during periods of unemployment—even 
though their reasons for leaving work were consistent with the purpose 
of the Act. 
C. A Standard Is Necessary to Advance the Purpose of the 
Employment Security Act and the Remedial Purpose of 
Unemployment Compensation Generally 
The preamble to the Employment Security Act explains both the 
consequences of unemployment and the importance of ameliorating its 
effects.358 The purpose of the Act is to protect and assist “persons 
unemployed through no fault of their own, and [the Act is to] be liberally 
construed for the purpose of reducing involuntary unemployment and 
the suffering caused thereby to the minimum.”359 The current rule-based 
statute frustrates, rather than advances, that purpose. 
As discussed in Part II.B, rules and standards tend to express certain 
social values and discourage others.360 Rules, at their best, promote 
precision, efficiency, order, and stability.361 However, they also express 
rigidity, conformity, indifference, punitiveness, stinginess, and 
sclerosis.362 None of those values are consistent with the remedial 
purpose of the Act or of unemployment compensation generally. 
The Act is part of an unemployment compensation program that 
serves a broad remedial purpose. It protects not only against the loss of 
income, but also against the attendant social consequences of losing a 
356. Id. at 3. The study focused only on the initial action that ESD would have taken, and it is 
impossible to know how those cases would ultimately have been resolved. See 2005 ESD STUDY, 
supra note 331, at 5 (“Insufficient time has passed since the study period to accurately determine the 
outcomes of the appeal processes.”). 
357. See WASH. REV. CODE § 50.01.010 (2012). 
358. Id. 
359. Id. 
360. See supra Part II.B. 
361. Kennedy, supra note 71, at 1710. 
362. Id. 
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job.363 A rigid application—that is, a rule-based application—of the 
statute that purports to advance those goals cannot possibly achieve 
them. The rigidity and stinginess364 often associated with rules prevent 
such a system from providing an adequate remedy in this context. 
Moreover, the Act is to be “liberally construed” for the benefit of 
unemployed people.365 Liberal construction of statutes “allows more 
latitude for drawing inferences from statutory language” and “gives a 
statute more elbow room for the sake of achieving statutory purposes 
and goals.”366 But the current rule does precisely the opposite: it 
eliminates (not just restricts) an adjudicator’s discretion to use “elbow 
room” to help protect people who are involuntarily unemployed. This is 
inconsistent with liberal construction. 
Standards, by contrast, more effectively advance the remedial goals of 
unemployment compensation and of the Act. Standards promote 
flexibility, individualization, equity, evolution, generosity, and 
empathy.367 These virtues are consistent with the goals of unemployment 
compensation: not just to provide income to unemployed people, but 
also to protect them more broadly during periods of unemployment.368 
Additionally, restoring discretion in a standard-based statute would 
allow the kind of flexibility that is critical to liberal construction.369 A 
standard would therefore more effectively advance the purpose of the 
Act and of unemployment compensation generally. 
In short, the rule-based disqualification not only fails to advance the 
purpose of the Employment Security Act, but also significantly frustrates 
that purpose. That result is inconsistent with the statutory text370 and 
363. Eveline M. Burns, Unemployment Compensation and Socio-Economic Objectives, 55 YALE 
L.J. 1, 10 (1945) (“Finally, the popularity of unemployment insurance, and its administrative 
convenience as a device for assuring a continuous flow of income during substantial periods of 
unemployment, coupled with a failure to devise socially acceptable and more obviously appropriate 
methods of providing security for those excluded, have everywhere led to a broadening of the 
functions of the unemployment insurance program.”). 
364. See Kennedy, supra note 71, at 1710. 
365. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.01.010 (2012). Although the legislature removed this language in 
2003, see Act of June 20, 2003, ch. 4, sec. 1, § 2, 2003 Wash. Sess. Laws 2d Spec. Sess. at 2782–83 
(codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 50.01.010 (Supp. 2003)), it restored the language in 2006. See Act 
of Apr. 22, 2005, ch. 133, sec. 2, § 1, 2005 Wash. Sess. Laws 376, 377 (codified at WASH. REV. 
CODE § 50.01.010 (2012)). 
366. Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Coming to Terms with Strict and Liberal Construction, 64 ALB. L. 
REV. 9, 38 (2000). 
367. Kennedy, supra note 71, at 1710. 
368. See Burns, supra note 363, at 15. 
369. See Mullins, supra note 366, at 38. 
370. See id. 
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with the remedial goals of unemployment compensation more 
generally.371 A rule that so seriously compromises the goals of the 
underlying statute is unjustifiable. 
V. PROPOSED REVISED STATUTORY TEXT 
To cure (or at least ameliorate) the serious problems with the current 
rule, Washington should amend its voluntary quit disqualification372 and 
restore standard-based language that allows the agency and the courts to 
exercise discretion when determining whether a claimant had good cause 
for leaving work. 
First, the language of section 2(a) should be amended.373 The current 
statute contains language restricting good cause to the enumerated 
reasons of section 2(b).374 That language should be removed, and the 
revised statute should read: 
An individual shall be disqualified from benefits beginning with 
the first day of the calendar week in which he or she has left 
work voluntarily without good cause and thereafter for seven 
calendar weeks and until he or she has obtained bona fide work 
in employment covered by this title and earned wages in that 
employment equal to seven times his or her weekly benefit 
amount. 
There is no theoretical problem with retaining section 2(b)’s enumerated 
list of good cause reasons.375 In fact, retaining those examples of good 
cause could provide useful guidance to the agency and the courts.376 
However, an additional subsection should be added to the statute to 
explain that other, non-enumerated reasons may also be good cause. 
Section 2(b) should be amended to include the following subsection: 
(xii) The individual left work for other good cause. Good cause 
includes: 
(A) Work-connected factors, such as the degree of risk involved 
to the individual’s health, safety, and morals, the individual’s 
physical fitness for the work, the individual’s ability to perform 
371. See Burns, supra note 363, at 15. 
372. WASH. REV. CODE § 50.20.050 (2012). 
373. Id. § 50.20.050(2)(a). 
374. Id. (“Good cause reasons to leave work are limited to reasons listed in (b) of this 
subsection.”). 
375. Id. § 50.20.050(2)(b). 
376. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 71, at 1710 (observing that rules can promote uniformity, 
precision, certainty, and stability). 
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the work, a substantial deterioration in the work or workplace, 
and such other work-connected factors as the commissioner may 
deem pertinent; and 
(B) Compelling personal reasons that would cause a reasonably 
prudent person to leave work. 
Striking the last sentence of section 2(a) would, in conjunction with the 
proposed revision to section 2(b), restore the administrative and judicial 
discretion necessary for a fair application of the Act. These revisions 
would return the voluntary quit statute to a more theoretically sound, and 
more fundamentally just, standard. 
CONCLUSION 
For almost seventy years, the ESD and the courts had substantial 
discretion to determine whether a claimant had good cause for leaving 
work. Over the years, the legislature did somewhat restrict the scope of 
that discretion. But until 2003 discretion played an important role in 
ensuring that people who left work for reasons consistent with the 
purpose of the Employment Security Act received the unemployment 
benefits to which they were entitled. By allowing holistic, fact-specific, 
individualized determinations, the standard-based statute ensured that 
the Act served its purpose: to protect and assist people who were 
unemployed through no fault of their own. But the 2003 and 2009 
amendments—which removed all discretion and replaced it with a short, 
exclusive list of good cause reasons—undermined the efficacy of the 
Act. To give effect to the Act’s purpose, to reduce the suffering of 
unemployed people, and to ensure the fundamental fairness of good 
cause determinations, Washington should restore discretion to the statute 
and return to a standard: “without good cause.” 
 
